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Abstract
This study sheds light on particular issues of poultry imports to the EU during the 
1996–2014 period. First, we analyze the mechanisms of EU market protection 
through the evolution of tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs), both descriptively 
and econometrically. Second, we estimate bilateral ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) 
of different types of NTMs imposed on the imports of poultry to the EU. These 
AVEs hint towards the diverse impact of NTMs on various exporters based on 
their production compatibilities with EU standards. Third, we analyze the quality 
impact of NTMs, which are also differentiated by the exporting countries. 
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1  Introduction1
Within the traditional trade policy frameworks, tariffs have been the main 
instrument to protect the domestic industries and consumers by raising the tax 
on the imports of undesired products. Since the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) have facilitated 
trade liberalization by lowering tariff rates, especially in advanced economies, 
non-tariff measures (NTMs) have become more attractive tools to regulate the 
flows of products to a country. WTO agreements allow member states to impose 
qualitative regulations, standards, and security and safeguard measures in order 
to improve safety, human and animal health, environmental quality, and market 
efficiencies. However, complying with these regulations makes them trade-
restrictive. Therefore, these measures are sometimes also referred to as non-tariff 
barriers to trade.
As long as the standards embodied within the NTMs improve the quality of 
the products so that the consumer health or environmental quality improves, 
the imposition of these trade policy tools might be accepted by trade partners. 
However, there are not yet many evident and scientific arguments behind their 
imposition, particularly if quality standards and preferences differ. 
For instance, the EU legislations within sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures against genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and hormones in meats 
restrict the imports of biotech agricultural and food products. The introduction 
of these measures caused dispute settlement cases consulted with the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO, as the imports to the EU were restricted. 
In the hormones case, the final decisions of arbitrators determined CAD 11.3 
million and USD 116.8 million as the level of nullification suffered by Canada 
and the USA, respectively. In the biotech case, although there was a mutually 
agreed solution between the EU, Canada, and Argentina, on January 2008, the 
1 This paper was produced as part of the project “Productivity, Non-Tariff Measures and Openness” (PRONTO) 
funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Program, Theme SSH.2013.4.3-3 “Untapped 
Potential for Growth and Employment Reducing the Cost of Non-Tariff Measures in Goods, Services and 
Investment”, Grant agreement No. 613504.
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request for retaliation by the US was approved by the DSB of the WTO. Despite 
the intention of the EU to protect its society and its final consumers by imposing 
the quality standards, no scientific evidence has been provided so far justifying the 
trade restrictiveness of these NTMs.
Similar debates are still ongoing about other regulations in force, regarding what 
the media has dubbed “chlorinated chicken”. This is a restriction on the imports of 
poultry washed with certain pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs). The ban has 
existed in the EU market since 1997 with several amendments. In October 2006, 
the US raised a specific trade concern (STC) against the SPS measures imposed 
by the EU to the WTO claiming that “although the European Commission had 
proposed legislation permitting the use of PRTs in January 2006, the ban on 
imported poultry had not been removed”. The EU legislation would suggest 
that the use of antimicrobial treatments (AMTs) might be abused to compensate 
for the low hygienic quality of production. If the set of quality standards for 
poultry in an exporting country such as the US were high enough, they could 
increase their exports to the EU, eliminating the use of AMTs and PRTs. Finally, 
in January 2009, the US asked the DSB for consultations with the EU regarding 
these regulations and some other members reserved their third-party rights, while 
the panel body has not yet been set up for the case.
Therefore, the arguments pro and con can go beyond an individual country when 
it comes to standards and regulations. In general, when an exporting country 
produces at similar production standards as the country imposing the regulations 
does, the implication of the NTM is not necessarily trade-restrictive. However, 
there might be certain quality improvements in the countries that are not achieving 
the same level of standards. With respect to the recent trade negotiations, it is 
important to see how the two economic partners meet each other’s standards. 
For instance, a study by Dal Bianco, Boatto, Caracciolo, and Santeramo (2015) 
indicates that SPS regulations do not hinder global wine exports. However, 
different requirements of technical barriers to trade (TBTs) have diverse impeding 
effects on wine exports. Disdier, Fontagné, and Cadot (2015) provide empirical 
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evidence that even the North-South harmonization of standards has had a 
negative influence on South-South trade. Harmonization of regional standards 
harms North-South trade while the international standards harmonization could 
stimulate it. It can be argued that the existing framework of standards between 
the two partners can identify the contractual terms of the agreements, in which 
standard-like trade barriers and NTMs could be implemented.
A problem emerges when the domestic legal systems of countries diverge 
substantially. De Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) provide empirical evidence in a 
gravity framework that the harmonization of food regulations within the EU has 
significantly increased intra-EU trade. However, regulations within the EU could 
essentially differ from those of other countries such as the United States, mainly 
because the legal systems are different. For instance, in the EU producers are 
responsible for initially proving that their products do not harm the consumers; 
only then are they permitted to produce. In contrast, according to international 
regulations within the WTO agreements, which are closer to the legal framework 
in the US, production shall not be halted until evidence is provided that the 
consumer is harmed by the product. These systematic differences determining the 
trade regulations have resulted in several trade disputes. 
Where scientific evidence for trade restrictions is not available or remains disputed, 
standards and NTMs might lead to economic losses by trade disputes due to 
differences in the legal systems of the two sides in the conflict. Such disputes 
could be avoided by mutual recognition of such differences in the legal systems. 
Some scholars discuss asymmetries of information between the two trade partners 
when a complete ban is caused by trade regulations that are not in line with 
the international standards or any scientific evidence (Bown & Hillman, 2016, 
2017).
Due to their delicate health-related issues, food and agricultural products 
are considered to be the most important products with respect to concerns of 
consumers in shaping policies of the governments and ultimately trade partnership 
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agreements. Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) focused on the stringency of 
EU regulations on aflatoxins based on a major health concern of the policymakers 
within the EU that considerably hampers the food imports from Africa. 
Scholars study the different impacts of regulations on the global demand and trade 
of food products. The findings of Fontagné, Mimouni, and Pasteels (2005) suggest 
a trade-hampering effect of regulations on only some specific products. Disdier, 
Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) find diverse impacts of NTMs on the imports 
of different countries. SPS measures impose less trade costs on the US exports of 
corn than distance and tariffs do according to the study by Jayasinghe, Beghin, 
and Moschini (2010). Winchester et al. (2012) also address the impeding effect 
of NTMs on agricultural trade by defining the heterogeneity index measuring the 
diverse regulations between the exporter and the importer. Empirical evidence on 
the US phytosanitary measures on fresh fruit imports found by Peterson, Grant, 
Roberts, and Karov (2013) suggests that the negative impact of these measures 
diminishes as the exporters gain experience in facing these regulations after a 
while until they completely comply with them. Melo, Engler, Nahuehual, Cofre, 
and Barrena (2014) show that the stringency of SPS measures and quality-related 
standards impede the Chilean fruit exports dramatically. 
This paper focuses on the implications of NTMs imposed on poultry trade to 
the EU. Using an empirical framework, the impact of NTMs on imports is 
differentiated by trade partners and by product categories. As discussed above, 
the literature is rich in the trade consequences of NTMs but to our knowledge 
there is a lack in assessing quality impacts. Using a dataset provided by Feenstra 
and Romalis (2014), the quality and quality-adjusted price of the traded products 
are differentiated, which can hint towards the quality impact of NTMs based on 
the existing standards of the exporting countries. Additionally, NTMs notified to 
the WTO and compiled under the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) 
are used in this analysis. Most importantly, the impact of both TBT and SPS 
measures imposed by the EU on the quality and price of imports of poultry to the 
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EU is differentiated by the exporting country, which we see as the most important 
contribution to the existing literature. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, EU poultry 
imports are analyzed descriptively and the impact of NTMs imposed by the EU 
on poultry imports is assessed econometrically. Ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) 
of EU notifications are then presented and analyzed in the third section. Section 
four analyzes the quality impact of EU measures. Finally, section five concludes. 
2 EU Poultry Imports and Trade Policy
2.1  Descriptive Analysis
According to the European Commission, the poultry sector2 in the EU 
(characterized by an excess export of about 3 percent of the production in 2014) 
is one of the major producers in the world. Trade in this sector has evolved since 
1996. Figure 1 shows that a major part of this development was mainly due 
to the increase of intra-EU trade. This increasing trend of trade among the EU 
member states was mostly due to the accession of new member states (NMSs) 
such as Poland with the highest production of about 13 percent of total EU 
poultry production3 and second highest intra-EU export of 15 percent (after the 
Netherlands with 26 percent of intra-EU export) in 2014. However, extra-EU 
trade stayed rather low and lost its importance over years. While extra-EU trade 
accounted for 18 percent of total EU imports of poultry products, it gradually 
decreased to 12 percent after the accession of NMSs in 2004 and to 6.6 percent 
in 2014. This indicates a preference for consumption of EU-produced products, 
which might result from different standards and trade policy measures within the 
EU market.
2 Here the trade data on poultry refer to sector 0114 of SITC Rev. 2, which are all corresponding products within 
sector 0207 in HS Rev. 1996 excluding fresh or chilled edible fatty livers of ducks or geese coded in 020734.
3  More details can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/poultry/index_en.htm
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Figure 2 shows some of the major extra-EU suppliers of poultry products. Among 
extra-EU exporters, Brazil is the major supplier of poultry; its share reached as 
much as 84.5 percent of extra-EU imports in 2005. Until 2002, Thailand had 
been the second major exporter of poultry to the EU with 28 percent of extra-
EU imports. However, after 2003 it was replaced by Chile with over 10 percent 
of extra-EU imports. Argentina is another South American large supplier of 
poultry to the EU with an average share of 4.3 percent since the turn of the new 
millennium. In 2014, Ukraine became another major exporter of poultry to the 
EU, covering around 9 percent of extra-EU imports, after the EU had granted 
unilateral trade preferences to Ukraine following the “Maidan revolution”. The 
United States have accounted for less than 1 percent of extra-EU poultry imports 
since 1997. 
The decreasing share of extra-EU imports of poultry coincides with an increasing 
number of qualitative NTMs. Figure 3 shows that the number of EU regulations 
within SPS measures and TBTs notified to the WTO has increased since 1996. 
Most of these SPS measures and all TBTs are imposed against all countries in 
the world. Regulations imposed by the EU range from emergency SPS measures 
for the protection of human health against avian influenza in Chile to regular 
unilateral SPS measures regarding salmonella in fresh poultry meat, and to 
labelling and consumer information measures within TBTs. There are a few STCs 
that are raised against the imposition of other SPS measures and TBTs that are 
not directly notified to the WTO. However, among the TBTs and SPS measures, 
there are also some STCs that are raised against the directly notified measures by 
the EU to the WTO. In 2006, the USA raised an STC against an EU regulation 
on PRT usage that had been in force since 1997. This regulation also coincides 
with a sudden fall in the imports from the US as depicted in Figure 2. There are 
also a few special safeguards (SSGs) during the period that were mainly price-
based measures to control import surges due to price falls.
125
Mahdi Ghodsi and Robert Stehrer
EU Trade Regulations and Imports of Hygienic Poultry
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 21   :   No. 2   :   December 2019   :   pp. 117-149


































































































SPS SPS STC SSG TBT TBT STC
Source: Ghodsi, Grübler, Reiter, and Stehrer (2016).





















































































































Trade-weighted average tariff Average tariff
Average SPS Average TBT
Source: Ghodsi et al. (2016).
126
Mahdi Ghodsi and Robert Stehrer
EU Trade Regulations and Imports of Hygienic Poultry
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 21   :   No. 2   :   December 2019   :   pp. 117-149
It should be noted that some NTMs focus on more than one product and some 
are also related to specific substances that are used in the production of other 
intermediate goods used in the production of poultry. This results in a larger 
effectiveness of a given NTM. Some of the (non)discriminatory NTMs are also 
effective against the imports from several other countries, which affects a larger 
number of bilateral trade flows. Therefore, instead of considering the number of 
NTMs notified to the WTO, one can get a more precise picture of these policy 
measures by observing their effective coverage. The average number of NTMs 
affecting detailed bilateral trade flows (here the level of detail is the 6-digit HS 
product classification) is seen as a good proxy measuring the effective coverage.
The effective coverage of the NTMs is depicted in Figure 4. Again, it is evident that 
the average number of NTMs affecting bilateral 6-digit tariff lines is increasing 
over time. Since SPS measures are typically regulations on food safety, standards, 
and human health, the coverage of SPS measures on poultry imports are more 
effective than that of TBTs. Another interesting point concerns the average tariff 
in the sector that had a peak of 26 percent in 2005 and gradually decreased to 
its lowest level of 17 percent in 2013. Considering the trade-weighted average 
(TWA), tariffs show a slightly different picture. In fact, the highest TWA imposed 
effectively by the EU was above 31 percent in 2007, coinciding with the financial 
crisis. This shows that product lines with higher trade values were affected by 
higher tariff rates. Moreover, the overall picture shows that while tariffs have been 
reduced over the years by WTO concession commitments and by EU customs 
unions, effective imposed NTMs emerged. Together with the decreasing share of 
extra-EU trade, it can be argued that NTM proliferation was more effective than 
tariff reduction as a restrictive trade policy measure. In the following subsection, 
we test this econometrically.
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2.2 Gravity Framework
Since we are interested in analyzing the impact of the trade policy measures 
implemented by the EU on bilateral import flows of poultry to the EU, we need 
to apply a structural gravity framework, which is a common methodology in 
the literature. Bilateral trade flows were studied first in the gravity framework 
by Tinbergen (1962). This seminal gravity framework econometrically assesses 
how trade volumes are determined as a function of economic size of the two 
trading partners (e.g., GDP) and the geographical distance between them. This 
framework has been extended and widely developed in the literature since then. 
Using a theoretical model with constant elasticity of substitution, Anderson 
(1979) conceptualized gravity in a theoretical framework. Later, in an imperfect 
competition framework, Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) developed the structural gravity model with multilateral 
resistance terms. Many other economic factors and trade policy measures 
affecting trade flows, and their impact on welfare, are extensively studied using 
the structural gravity model (see, e.g., Arkolakis, Costinot, & Rodríguez-Clare, 
2012; Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, & Larch, 2016; Dhingra et al., 2017, for 
recent contributions). 
The analysis in this paper builds on this recent literature with respect to the 
structural gravity framework (see Head & Mayer, 2014) to study how the trade 
policy measures implemented by the European Union on poultry products affect 
the patterns of imports and the related quality of products. Therefore, a formal 
structural gravity framework is used to study the impact of NTMs on the imports 
of poultry to the 28 member states of the EU from all over the world. More 
concretely, the following gravity equation is estimated:
( ) ( ) ( )
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where ln(mijht+1) is the natural logarithm of the respective trade indicator of the 
HS 6-digit product h imported to country i from country j at time t+1. We use 
trade value (in USD), trade quantity, and trade price (unit value in USD) as 
three indicators of the dependent variable in separate estimations. Trade data are 
collected from UN Comtrade. Tijht is the effective tariff rate imposed on the traded 
product at time t. Tariff is compiled as AVEs of tariffs estimated by the UNCTAD 
method. Priority of tariff information is firstly effectively applied rates; where they 
are not available, preferential tariffs are used; and when none of them exists, the 
most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs are used. NTMnijht represents the number of 
NTMs of type n being in force or initiated at time t by the EU against partner j. Gijt 
is a vector of gravity covariates common in the literature capturing country-pair 
characteristics and consists of classical gravity variables and factor endowments. It 
includes traditional market potential of trade partners that is the natural logarithm 
of the sum of both countries’ expenditure-side real GDP (gijt ). Additionally, we use 
the output-side real GDP per capita for the economic development of a country 
and use it in the indicator used by Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2003) as follows:









it jt it jt
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y y
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In addition, Gijt includes distance between the trading partners in three relative 
factor endowments: labor force L, capital stock K, and agricultural land area A 
as follows:
( ) ( )

















Data for the aforementioned gravity variables are gathered from the Penn World 
Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). Further gravity variables that enter 
our regressions are the exchange rate of the partner country in the importer’s 
currency (Xrijt ), a dummy variable for preferential trade agreement (PTA) between 
the two partners, and a dummy indicating intra-EU trade (i.e., both partners are 
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EU members at time t). Since all EU-28 members are included as importers in 
the sample, a dummy variable indicating the EU membership of the importer is 
also included, denoted by EUit . These variables are all in current US dollars as 
collected from international sources.
Furthermore, some fixed effects are included to capture the multilateral resistances. 
In fact, in the first specification, only country-pair-product fixed effects (ωijh ) and 
time fixed effect (ωt ) are added in the panel fixed effect estimation. In the second 
specification, importer-time (ωit ) and exporter-time (ωij ) effects are added instead 
of time-fixed effects. While those two specifications are estimated by normal OLS, 
in a third specification, Poisson estimation controlling for country-pair-product 
and time fixed effects is used to additionally control for zero trade flows.
In an important contribution, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that in a 
log-linearized model, normal OLS would give biased estimators due to 
heteroscedasticity. For the estimation of the gravity model in particular, they 
propose Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML). PPML is then extensively 
applied in the estimation of gravity models that also controls for available zero 
trade value in the dependent variable, which drops out of the sample after taking 
the logarithm. Zero bilateral trade flow in a given year could be an indication 
of large trade costs leading to falling extensive margins to trade (Melitz, 2003; 
Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2008; Bingzhan, 2011; Larch, Wanner, Yotov, 
& Zylkin, 2018). Therefore, dropping those zero trade values from the estimation 
could cause a sample selection bias4. Inclusion of country-time effects in the 
Poisson estimation could cause non-convergence in the estimation. Because of 
many missing observations in explanatory variables (such as tariffs), it would not 
be possible to estimate a full balanced panel via the Poisson regressions.5  
Further, it is necessary to also control for the possible endogeneity bias. One 
source of endogeneity bias is related to the omitted variables bias. According to 
4 However, when such zero trade flows are country-specific, meaning that a given country-pair has never experienced 
a non-zero trade over time, the country-pair fixed effects could control for that.
5 Since zero price could not be correctly interpreted, Poisson estimate is not presented for unit values. However, the 
estimation results are available upon request.
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the theoretical foundations of structural gravity, this bias is controlled by using 
the necessary fixed effects (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003; Baldwin & Taglioni, 
2007; Larch et al., 2018). Another source of endogeneity is related to the reverse 
causality bias. In other words, when import flows surge, policymakers might 
impose protectionist trade policy measures to restrict trade flows. Therefore, the 
contemporaneous trade flow (dependent variable) might affect the imposition of 
new NTMs (explanatory variables). And as the dependent variable is by definition 
dependent on the error term, the explanatory variable would correlate with the 
contemporaneous error causing the endogeneity bias. In order to reduce the 
endogeneity bias of NTMs due to the simultaneity and reverse causality, gravity 
literature uses the lags of NTMs (Bao & Qiu, 2012; Imbruno, 2016). Therefore, 
in this paper all explanatory variables are also lagged.
Table 1 presents the results of the gravity model estimations on the EU-28 
poultry imports from all over the world. The first panel to the left shows the OLS 
results controlling for only bilateral product and time fixed effects (FEs), which is 
the same as panel FE. The middle panel shows the estimation results controlling 
for additional country-time effects. The third panel shows the Poisson FE results 
controlling for the zero trade flows. The sample under estimation excluding zero 
trade flows has 31,283 bilateral trade flows, while the sample size including all 
zero and positive trade flows under estimation is 93,910. In all regressions, tariffs 
affect trade flows negatively. After controlling for country-time effects, which 
in theory captures the multilateral resistances, SPS measures show to be trade-
enhancing. In addition, controlling for the zero trade flows, Poisson regressions 
suggest that tariff lines affected by SPS measures have higher trade values and 
quantities. However, these have no statistically significant impact on trade unit 
values reflecting the product cost or quality.
STCs that are raised by exporters against SPS measures imposed by the EU 
statistically significantly increase the price of traded products controlling for 
bilateral-product effects. However, since these measures are country-time 
observations in the sample, controlling for those country-time effects in the 
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second panel hints to an opposite but insignificant impact of these measures on 
prices.
TBTs imposed on poultry imports statistically significantly reduce trade flows, 
which is robust in all specifications. In fact, results in the first panel suggest that 
a 1 percent increase in the number of TBTs imposed on poultry products can 
substantially decrease the traded quantity and value by about 0.3 percent, which 
translates to around 30 percent marginal impact of TBTs on trade. Drawing 
on results from the Poisson estimates, while both quantity and value of trade 
are reduced by TBTs, it can be argued that the implication of TBTs on the 
imported poultry to the EU is not quality- but cost-increasing, which leads to 
lower demand. However, in the middle panel where the changes in preferences of 
the importing country and the production patterns of the exporter countries are 
controlled by the FE, the impact of TBTs on import prices is negative. This might 
further indicate a lower price or quality of products induced by TBTs, where 
those patterns are captured by the FE showing the trade restrictiveness of these 
measures on poultry imports.
TBT STCs do not statistically significantly affect the dependent variables except 
in one specification. As can be interpreted from the first panel, over time, they 
only increase the price of imports from the partner country raising them to the 
WTO, but have no significant influence on their trade values.
Table 1:  Gravity Estimations on EU Poultry Import
Estimation OLS OLS Poisson
Dep. Var. Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value Quantity
αT -1.43*** -1.34*** 0.083 -1.26** -1.53** -0.27 -0.23 -1.12***
(0.34) (0.36) (0.10) (0.60) (0.63) (0.17) (0.44) (0.42)
αSPS -0.0019 0.015 0.017 0.43* 0.47* 0.043 0.23** 0.17*
(0.072) (0.076) (0.019) (0.23) (0.24) (0.082) (0.10) (0.095)
αSPSSTC -0.23 -0.0081 0.23*** -0.43 -0.50 -0.073 -1.37* -2.09**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.073) (0.60) (0.67) (0.18) (0.77) (0.82)
αTBT -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.0035 -0.34 -0.44* -0.11* -0.33*** -0.38***
(0.065) (0.067) (0.015) (0.23) (0.24) (0.062) (0.075) (0.085)
αTBTSTC -0.066 0.13 0.20*** 0.51 0.37 -0.14 0.45 0.58
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(0.25) (0.26) (0.058) (0.95) (0.85) (0.28) (0.42) (0.41)
αSSG 0.19* 0.12 -0.071*** 0.11 0.045 -0.061* -0.35** -0.27
(0.11) (0.11) (0.027) (0.14) (0.14) (0.035) (0.15) (0.17)
αADP -6.65*** -10.0***
(1.54) (1.38)
gijt 1.30*** 1.19*** -0.10 1.53* 1.84** 0.31 1.87*** 1.46***
(0.30) (0.31) (0.088) (0.75) (0.79) (0.23) (0.33) (0.31)
yijt -0.00086 0.0061 0.0069** -0.0056 -0.0031 0.0025 0.00039 0.015
(0.0094) (0.0098) (0.0029) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0033) (0.011) (0.011)
fLijt -0.18 -0.28 -0.10 27437.6 -86337.2 -113774.8 0.19 -0.22
(0.24) (0.26) (0.072) (.) (880486.6) (1386957.6) (0.35) (0.33)
fKijt 0.30** 0.22* -0.080** -18961.7 -27455.5 -8493.8 0.44** 0.49***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.035) (.) (309060.7) (489766.1) (0.17) (0.17)
fAijt 0.13 0.24 0.12 -89940.5 -33786.0 56154.5 0.54 0.54
(0.34) (0.36) (0.095) (.) (469137.2) (722122.8) (0.54) (0.56)
Xrijt -0.0043 -0.0078* -0.0035* -0.0015 -0.0057 -0.0041** -0.0035 -0.0071
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0020) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0045)
PTA 0.41** 0.46** 0.048 0.11 0.086 -0.027 1.28*** 1.24***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.055) (0.49) (0.51) (0.12) (0.22) (0.18)
Intra-EU -0.27 -0.12 0.15*** -395.2 3398.9 3794.1 0.55* 0.33
(0.24) (0.25) (0.058) (.) (35254.1) (55707.0) (0.32) (0.28)
EUit 0.27 0.017 -0.25*** 0.42 0.40 -0.011 -0.18 -0.50**
(0.20) (0.21) (0.050) (0.67) (0.70) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20)
Constant -6.39 -5.75 0.64 -45756.2 -92101.9 -46345.7
(4.16) (4.30) (1.22) (.) (1016551.7) (1611701.7)
ωijh Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ωt Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
ωit No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
ωjt No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
N 31283 31283 31283 31283 31283 31283 93910 93910
R-sq 0.769 0.776 0.708 0.795 0.800 0.731
Adj. R-sq 0.735 0.743 0.665 0.754 0.761 0.680
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country-pair-products).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors' estimations.
The interpretation of the results of other explanatory variables is rather 
straightforward.6 Market potential (gijt ) increases trade flows, while differences 
6 Antidumping (ADP) measures in the sample do not relate to many positive trade flows, but they are mainly 
reflected in the Poisson estimations including zero trade flows over time in the panel. Thus, they are very trade-
restrictive with statistically significant negative coefficients leading to zero trade flows.
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in the economic development (yijt ) increase the trade unit values. Difference in 
physical capital between the trade partners is the only factor endowment variable 
affecting trade values statistically significantly. In fact, the first and third panels 
suggest that when the two countries are very distant in terms of capital endowments, 
they trade more in poultry products with lower prices. However, controlling for 
country-time effects makes trade variables very sensitive to the differences in factor 
endowments with large but statistically insignificant coefficients. Depreciation of 
domestic currency against the trade partner’s currency reduces the traded quantity, 
but it also decreases the unit value of the imported product. When an NMS 
accesses the EU, its imports from all trade partners become cheaper, according 
to the results of the first specification. Moreover, when both partners become 
EU members and their trade becomes part of intra-EU trade, the traded unit 
value increases, which might reflect the quality improvement. Controlling for 
zero trade flows in the Poisson regression, when both partners are EU members, 
they experience higher trade integration.
3 Ad Valorem Equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs
In the previous section, the impact of NTMs on bilateral trade flows to single EU 
member states was presented. Quality standards and regulations embodied within 
the NTMs can have a diverse impact on bilateral trade flows depending on the type 
of product and the exporting partner. When the production process and quality 
of standards are at a similar level between the two trade partners, the impact of 
NTMs might promote trade. This happens because of the trade diversion from 
countries that produce the product with lower standards (compared to the ones 
in the imposing country) to countries with equal or higher standards than those 
existing in the imposing country. Thus, the trade implication of NTMs can be 
analyzed more accurately when exporters and products are differentiated rather 
than pooling them in one econometrics sample.
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Additionally, the impact of NTMs on trade values might stem from different 
channels of quantity and quality. When a trade-restrictive NTM is aimed at 
quality improvement of the imported product, this is likely reflected in a higher 
price of imports. However, depending on the preferences of consumers for higher 
or lower quality, trade values might go in opposite directions. On the other hand, 
the imposed NTM might have no impact on the quality but influence the price 
due to higher trade costs or trade facilitation. Depending on the demand elasticity 
of the product, this can lead to higher trade values even if the demanded quantity 
becomes lower.
Applying a two-stage framework first proposed by Looi Kee, Nicita, and 
Olarreaga (2009), further developed by Beghin, Disdier, and Marette (2015) 
allowing for positive externalities of NTMs, and Ghodsi, Gruebler, and Stehrer 
(2016a) additionally allowing to differentiate the impact by importers and the 
intensity of NTM types, we estimate the bilateral AVE for each type of NTM. In 
the first stage, bilateral import demand elasticities at the 6-digit level of the HS 
are estimated, which are differentiated by the country of origin of the imported 
product7. These elasticities are borrowed from an earlier study by Ghodsi et al. 
(2016b). In the second stage, using the number of each type of NTMs in force 
and interacting them with country-pair dummies, the impact of NTMs on the 
traded quantities is estimated as follows:
,
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where the traded quantity qijht+1 is estimated over independent variables by each 
6-digit product h in a panel data covering all countries in the world8. Compared 
7 For a detailed methodological framework on bilateral elasticities, refer to Ghodsi, Gruebler, and Stehrer (2016b) 
and Ghodsi and Stehrer (2017).
8 The reason for separating the product sample is to allow for faster estimations. The reason for having all countries 
in the world as importers is to differentiate the imposed NTMs by the EU from an average NTM’s impact of a 
benchmark importer.
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to equation (1), here NTMs are not in logarithm in order to calculate the AVEs 
from the coefficients as explained below. Also, each NTM is interacted with a 
country-pair dummy (ωijh ). Since NTMs imposed by the EU are the same across 
all EU members, there is one distinct dummy for all EU members as importers. 
Moreover, the number of NTMs for intra-EU trade is set at zero. Hence, coefficient 
αnωijh would give the distinct impact of the NTM on that bilateral trade flow to 
all EU members. However, due to differences in the elasticities across importers, 
the AVE of EU member states will differ. Because inclusion of all interactions 
with six types of NTMs exhausts the degrees of freedom, six estimations are run 
separately for each NTM-dummy interaction including other types of NTMs as 
control variables. The rest of the variables are similar to equation (1)9. Inclusion 
of numerous interaction variables with many zero values does not allow Poisson 
regression to converge, thus, panel FE estimation is used.
Finally, having estimated the bilateral quantity impacts (αnωijh ) and the bilateral 
import demand elasticities (εijh ) at hand, the bilateral AVE for each type of NTM 
is calculated as follows:














Table 2 presents the bilateral AVEs of NTMs imposed by the EU from 1996 to 
2014 averaged over all EU-28 members. The results suggest that SPS measures 
imposed by the EU have had a statistically significantly positive effect on 799 
product trade flows, whereas 703 flows have been affected negatively10. However, 
transposing the quantity effect into the AVEs using elasticities – of which some 
are positive – suggests that 788 of those SPS measures are characterized by 
9 It is important to note that country-year FE is removed in the specification that was collinear with NTM-dummy 
interactions.
10 The detailed estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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positive AVEs showing restrictiveness. The simple average (s.a.) of coefficients is 
negative, indicating that an additional SPS measure imposed by the EU reduces 
trade quantity to a single member state by 0.15 percent on average. Averaging 
across all EU-28 member states using import weights results in an average positive 
effect, indicating a 1.8 percent increase in bilateral trade flows to a single EU 
member after imposition of a new SPS measure. This result is in line with the 
ones discussed earlier. In fact, major trade partners’ exports of poultry to the EU 
have benefited from the SPS measures imposed by the EU while others’ exports 
to the EU were restricted by these measures. However, AVEs for SPS STCs show 
high restrictiveness for major trade partners. Trade-weighted average AVEs for 
the STCs raised against the EU poultry SPS measures are equivalent to a 27.74 
percent tariff. This might indicate why those trade partners raised STCs against 
SPS measures. 
The impact of TBTs on bilateral imports of poultry to the EU is slightly 
different. Both simple and weighted average AVEs of these measures show trade 
restrictiveness. About 60 percent of significant coefficients of TBTs are negative. 
Import weighted average of AVEs for technical regulations imposed by the EU 
on bilateral product flows is equivalent to about 6 percent, while this jumps to 
around 100 percent for the STCs raised against the TBTs. In fact, two-thirds 
of statistically significant coefficients of TBT STCs indicate reductions in trade 
quantities. 
Only three bilateral flows to the EU are affected by the imposed ADP measures. 
These are the imports from Taiwan to France, Ireland, and Poland. While the AVE 
of ADP measures imposed by Ireland is around 100 percent, this indicator for the 
other two importers is around 1 percent in average. This surprising result comes 
from the AVE of SSGs showing a negative sign using both types of averages. In 
the previous section, the average impact of SSGs imposed by the EU on the trade 
quantity was statistically insignificant. This is also reflected in the equal number 
of positive and negative AVEs of these measures.
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Table 2:  Bilateral AVEs of NTMs Imposed by the EU during 1996–2014 (EU-28 average)
EU-28 SPS SPS STC TBT TBT STC ADP SSG
AVE (s.a.) 0.39% -0.05% 0.19% 0.43% 0.04% -0.40%
αn (s.a.) -0.0015 -0.009 -0.013 -0.026 -0.003 -0.007
AVE (w.a.) -10.63% 27.74% 6.00% 99.67% 99.87% -11.34%
αn (w.a.) 0.018 -0.073 -0.079 0.672 -6.608 -0.088
Positive αn 799 113 412 45 0 372
Negative αn 703 130 600 91 3 273
Positive AVE 788 98 572 100 3 322
Negative AVE 714 145 440 36 0 323
Notes: Only trade flows with statistically significant estimates at the 10% level are used. s.a. refers to simple averages, 
w.a. refers to import-weighted averages. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
The estimations showing AVEs for each trade partner and each EU member as an 
importer indicate that even for some of the EU members as exporters, the AVEs 
are positive showing restrictiveness11.
4 Quality Impact of EU Measures 
4.1 Methodology
In the previous section, EU measures were found to be diversely affecting the 
poultry import quantities and prices. Usually, price of imports or traded unit 
values are considered as proxies for the quality of products. Products from 
developed countries that have higher quality are associated with higher unit values 
of trade. An NTM that is imposed against the import of a product can increase 
its price. However, it should not necessarily mean that the quality of the product 
is also increased. When the quality of the product is not affected by an NTM, the 
price can increase if the NTM induces a burden to the exporter as either a fixed or 
an ad valorem cost of exporting. In contrast, an NTM that is aimed at improving 
the market efficiency might decrease the costs of marketing of the product, which 
11 The detailed estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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can be reflected as a lower price but a similar quality. Therefore, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the quality and the quality-adjusted price.
Feenstra and Romalis (2014) propose a theoretical framework to disentangle 
trade values into a quantity, quality, and quality-adjusted price component. In 
their framework, both supply-side characteristics to produce higher quality based 
on higher productivity of firms, and consumer-driven characteristics for higher 
preferences for quality are implemented. Quality of the traded product is affected 
by both sides of trade, that is, by net costs associated with production of the 
product. Their final database on SITC Rev. 2 classification gives balanced bilateral 
trade values, quantity, unit values, quality, quality-adjusted price, and quality-
adjusted quantity. Using these data allows us to track the impact of NTMs on the 
quality and net price of quality of the traded products.
The specification is changed here to a sample of EU-28 bilateral imports from all 
trade partners as follows: 
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In the results presented below, the dependent variable ρ is either the quality of 
imported product or the unit value. The information on these variables is from 
Feenstra and Romalis (2014), covering the sector 0114 of SITC Rev. 2. Here 
instead of number of NTMs at levels, their logarithmic form is used to capture 
the elasticity impact. Since SSG and ADP measures are not quality-relevant 
regulations, these are included in the regressions as control variables. Other 
variables and econometric specifications remain unchanged. This specification 
including exporter-NTM interaction hints towards the diverse quality impact of 
EU regulations. In fact, for some countries that have already been producing with 
an equivalent quality to the EU standards, the imposed NTM might not have any 
significant impact. Based on the theoretical framework, quality levels of products 
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are structured relative to a benchmark country. Therefore, when a product’s 
quality from a specific exporter does not change while other exporters improve 
the quality of that product, the relative position of the focal exporter’s product 
quality is degraded. Thus, for each type of NTM, there will be one coefficient for 
an exporting country to analyze the impact. Both OLS and Poisson techniques 
with country-pair (ωijh ) and time (ωt ) fixed effects are used for this analysis. Both 
techniques yield similar results. 
4.2 Results
Table 3 presents the impact of the NTMs imposed by the EU on the quality (Q) 
and price (P) of the imported poultry from all exporting partners. These are in 
fact coefficients of each NTM n imposed by the EU against partner j (αnωijh) 
that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The results suggest that 
both SPS and TBT measures imposed by the EU influence the quality of imports 
positively for many exporters. The results can be interpreted in the following 
example. A 1 percent increase in the number of SPS measures imposed by the 
EU would increase the total unit value of poultry from the United Arab Emirates 
(ARE) by 350 percent, while around 48 percent of this increase (167 percent 
compared to 350 percent) is due to the quality improvement effect. In fact, a 
1 percent increase in the number of EU SPS measures will increase the quality 
and the quality-adjusted price of imports from ARE by 167.4 percent and 183 
percent, respectively. While this impact is very large for ARE, for many other 
exporters this impact is close to zero. 
An interesting finding refers to the impact of SPS measures on the imports from 
the US. The results suggest that since 199712, a 1 percent additional SPS measure 
imposed by the EU would decrease the quality of imports from the US by 0.165 
percent. While the price impact is about -0.161 percent, the EU regulations 
12 As explained before, the forward value of the dependent variable is used to reduce the simultaneity bias, which 
results in a one-year reduction of the sample. Moreover, quality data is available up to 2011. Therefore, the period 
of this analysis is 1997–2011.
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had a small positive impact on the quality-adjusted price of 0.004 percent. In 
fact, the EU regulations increased the costs of the imports from the US while 
degrading their quality. However, the SPS STCs raised by the US had a small 
positive impact on the quality and price of the imports. The EU regulations 
against the use of antimicrobial treatments (AMTs) were in place to prohibit 
misuse of these chemicals that were used to mitigate the low hygienic quality of 
the products through shipment, as reported in the notification. Complying with 
these regulations by the US exporters shows that the quality of their products 
has slightly reduced without these substances. TBTs have increased the quality 
of the products from the US while reducing their prices. This might refer to 
technical regulations that improve the market efficiencies by reducing the cost 
and improving the qualitative characteristics of products, especially those that are 
produced in similar standard settings. Therefore, it is important to note that these 
results are not based on any qualitative testing of the products but on economic 
quantification of quality and prices.
Quality and price of the two major exporters of poultry to the EU, namely 
Brazil and Argentina, are both affected negatively by NTMs. In contrast, NTMs 
imposed by the EU enhanced both quality and price of poultry from Thailand 
and China, two other major exporters. While quality and price of imports from 
Israel are not affected by these NTMs, price of poultry from Chile, another major 
exporter, is increased by SPS and SSG measures. Furthermore, quality and price 
of poultry from Canada are affected negatively by SPS measures. Again, negative 
impact of NTMs on the quality of imports from EU member states indicates a 
negative role of NTMs imposed by the NMSs before accession to the EU. This 
impact neutralized after harmonization with EU standards. 
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Table 3:  Bilateral Quality and Price Impact of NTMs Imposed by the EU during 1996–2011
NTM SPS TBT TBT STC SPS STC
Exporter Q P Q P Q P Q P
ARE 167.4% 350.4% 26.6% 51.5%
ARG -9.6% -11.4% -9.3%
AUS 75.3% 187.5% 65.9% 166.9%
AUT -0.1% -0.2%
BEL 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
BEN 10.4% 32.9% 13.3% 33.9%
BGR -3.5%
BRA -0.3% -0.3% -2.6% -12.3% -20.7%
CAN -4.4% -6.3%
CHE 5.1% 16.7% 6.7% 20.0% -13.0% -46.7%
CHL 11.0%
CHN 4.1% 6.0% 6.7%
CYP -0.7% -0.9%
CZE 5.2% 17.2% 6.6% 20.4%
DEU 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DNK 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
ESP 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
EST 1.1% 1.1%
FIN 0.0% 0.1%
FRA 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
GBR 0.1% 0.2% 0.0%
GEO 15.4% 31.7% 351.3% 884.5%
GRC -0.8% -1.7%
HRV 4.0% -17.7%
HUN 0.2% 0.3% -2.4% 0.2%
IRL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
ITA -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
KWT 18.8% 24.2%
LTU -7.5% -32.5% -14.9% -55.3%
NLD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
NOR 54.8% 140.8% 24.0% 57.5%
POL 4.8% 7.8% 3.8% 0.0%
PRT 0.0% 0.0%
ROM 8.6%
SVK 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.3%
SVN -0.1% -0.3%
SWE 0.1% 0.1%
THA 6.7% 9.9% 6.9% 7.1%
TUN 6.6% 10.9% 5.9% 8.8%
TUR 7.0% 16.8%
URY -4.4% -15.4% -4.7% -21.5%
USA -0.2% -0.2% 2.2% -5.6% -12.2% 0.0% 0.0%
ZAF -19.5% -40.4% -80.2% -143.2%
ZWE 10.2% 25.4% 4.0% 8.4%
Note: Only trade flows with statistically significant estimates at the 10% level are used.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The legal system in the EU is structured in a way that obliges producers to prove 
that their products do not harm the consumer. In contrast, WTO regulations 
similar to the legal system in the USA stipulate that consumers have to prove 
that a product harms them. Therefore, unless there is scientific evidence proving 
the harms of a traded product in the focus of an NTM, it will be very hard for 
the DSB to justify such an EU regulation. Some dispute settlement cases have 
prescribed penalties and remedies against EU regulations. Cases of prohibition 
of imports of meat produced with hormones and biotech feed such as GMOs 
have led to the imposition of large penalties against the European Community 
as it was unable to provide any scientific evidence of the products’ harmfulness. 
Another ongoing dispute concerns the chicken or poultry washed with certain 
AMTs, which has recently been in the media spotlight. There is no evidence to 
justify an EU regulation prohibiting such imports but the consumers’ community 
is concerned about the availability of such products in the EU market.
In this study, we analyze the imports of poultry to the EU with a special focus 
on the role of NTMs imposed by the EU. The small share of extra-EU poultry 
imports and the downward trend of this share in the past several years might 
indicate that the EU poultry market is well protected. While tariffs have been 
gradually decreasing over the years, an increasing number of NTMs have come 
into place. In a gravity framework, poultry imports (at the 6-digit level of the 
Harmonized System) to the 28 EU members during the 1996–2014 period were 
analyzed. A statistically significant negative impact of tariffs and technical barriers 
to trade on the imports of poultry was found. However, in two specifications 
controlling for multilateral resistances and zero trade flows, the results indicated 
that sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures imposed by the EU increase the 
trade values and quantities significantly. Moreover, STCs raised against TBTs and 
SPS measures were found to increase the unit values of imports.
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Exporting countries are heterogeneous in many aspects, including the level of 
standards at which they are producing. Exports of a country producing poultry 
at a lower level of quality than the EU standards might be affected negatively. In 
contrast, trade of a country that is producing with similar standards as the EU 
can benefit from the regulative trade policy measures imposed by the EU. Using a 
two-stage methodology, we calculated the bilateral AVEs for five types of NTMs 
imposed by the EU. The diverse impact of NTMs on different exporters resulted 
in various AVEs for NTMs. Some AVEs indicate trade promotion, such as 
negative AVEs for SPS measures for the USA and China. Moreover, the findings 
suggest that SPS measures maintained by the EU were in favor of major exporters 
of poultry to the EU, while other measures were generally restrictive.
The last part of the analysis was dedicated to the quality impact of NTMs on 
poultry imports to the EU. The diverse impacts of EU regulations on the quality 
of imports from different countries again show that the standards frameworks in 
exporting countries are very heterogeneous. The results suggest that SPS measures 
have influenced upgrading the quality of poultry imported from many countries, 
while degrading the quality and prices of imports from some major exporters. 
EU regulations prohibiting the use of AMTs suggested that these substances were 
used to mitigate the low hygienic quality of poultry. This means that not using 
them would lead to lower quality of the imported products, which could also be 
observed in the econometrics results.
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AMT Antimicrobial treatments 
ARG Argentina




DSB Dispute Settlement Body
EU European Union
GMO Genetically modified organisms 
ISR Israel
NMS New member states
NTM Non-tariff measures 
PRT Pathogen reduction treatments 
RoW Rest of the world
SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
SSG Special safeguards 
STC Specific trade concern




USA United States of America
WTO World Trade Organization 
